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Towards Triadic Interactions in Autism and Beyond:
Transitional Objects, Joint Attention, and Social Robotics
John Z. Elias, Patricia Bockelman Morrow, Jonathan Streater, Shaun Gallagher, and
Stephen M. Fiore
Institute for Simulation & Training, University of Central Florida
The concept of transitional objects from the British Object Relations school of psychoanalysis may offer
insight into the affective aspects of the development of dyadic and triadic interactions. Furthermore the
concept may be applied to the use of social robotics in autism research and therapy, with social robots in
these settings perhaps functioning as transitional objects for autistic children. Possible applications in
organizational contexts are suggested as well, along with considerations of future research relating
transitional
objects
to
the
notions
of
primary
and
secondary
intersubjectivity.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent use of robots for autism research and therapy has
received increasing attention, both in the scholarly and popular
press (Kozima et al 2009, Mone 2010). Such work may be
approached from multiple disciplinary perspectives, from
cognitive psychology to robotic engineering. Here we suggest
that input from a relatively neglected and often maligned field,
psychoanalysis, may illuminate the promise of social robotics
for autistic children. Specifically, robots in these contexts
may be playing the role of a transitional object in facilitating
interactions between child, caregiver and the environment.
This concept comes from D.W. Winnicott, a pediatrician and
psychoanalyst associated with the British object relations
school of psychoanalysis, and unlike other psychoanalytic
ideas is generally considered theoretically and therapeutically
reputable (Frankland, 2010). According to Winnicott, a
transitional object is an inanimate possession, usually a toy or
maybe a blanket (imagine Linus from Charlie Brown), that the
child attaches to as it moves from direct dependence on a
caregiver (usually the mother) towards understanding and
navigating an independently existing world (Winnicott,
1953). This transition involves the movement from dyadic to
triadic interactions, which entails the capacity for shared
intentionality and joint attention. While typically developing
children can manage with a strictly inanimate object as a
transitional object, children with autism may need an added
degree of animacy and interactivity for the transition to triadic
interactions to emerge. Whether the robotic interaction helps
autistic children move from the subjective toward the
objective world, or from objects towards people, or both, is an
open question to explore.
This rise in the role of robots in autism therapy indicates
further implications and applications for human-robotic social
interaction. For example, these notions may also relate to
organizational settings, where groups or teams relying on
robots or other technological artifacts may be viewed as
developing entities onto themselves in need of transition and
cohering. While a robot could serve as an object of care,
almost like a child or a pet, for human team members, it may
also serve as a point of joint attention, a common object that
helps to enable the team as an emerging entity. In this sense,
then, the robot might function as something of a transitional
object for the group or team as a whole, again as a shared

point of joint attention and focus that in turn fosters interaction
with the world. We conclude by considering future directions
for research, particularly the relation of transitional objects to
processes of primary and secondary intersubjectivity.
TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS
Winnicott, in his seminal introduction of the concept
(Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena: A Study of
the First Not-Me Possession, 1953), discusses a wide range of
possible objects and behaviors in terms of transitional
phenomena. Although inclusive and expansive as a category,
we will venture a condensed description of the concept itself,
which requires a preliminary sketch of early infant
development, as detailed by certain strains of psychoanalysis.
Again, despite the disrepute of psychoanalytic theory
generally, it is potentially elucidating as a kind of speculative
phenomenology of early childhood, with its investigation of
the initial emergence of the sense of self in relation to others.
Freud’s original elaboration focused primarily on the Oedipus
complex, on the dynamic between child, mother and father
occurring roughly between the ages of 3 to 6 years; the project
of expounding the earlier pre-Oedipal stages was taken up by
the British school of object relations, with Winnicott
especially expanding upon the early relationship of infant and
mother (Rycroft, 1995). Winnicott speculates that a seamless
oneness permeates the experience of early infancy. In this
state, the needs of the infant are (more or less) immediately
met by the mother (or primary caregiver), and so there is no
experience of separation between need and gratification,
desire and satisfaction; the very existence of desire guarantees
its satisfaction, as the appearance of desire and the presence of
its fulfillment are experienced seamlessly as one and the same.
The world, for the infant, seems to exist solely and exclusively
to answer desire, to meet it in immediate responsiveness. And
while this phase may be something of a theoretical
idealization, approximated only perhaps by prenatal union in
the womb (indeed this stage of seamless oneness is precarious
from the start, for presumably a newborn would not cry at all
if this state of symbiotic union were perfectly preserved), such
an extrapolation does hold some explanatory power,
positioning subsequent conceptions of need and desire in
relation to a point of comparison, however asymptotic. The
phenomenon of magical thinking, for example, in which
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people, in certain states of trauma, believe what they wish
were the case, that the world is just so in accord with their
desire, may be viewed in terms of regression to this preOedipal phase of infantile oneness with the world (e.g.,
Subbotsky, 1994).
This undividedness, of course, cannot last, and the reality
of a world existing independently of infantile desire starts to
make itself felt. The infant begins to recognize that it is
possible for its needs to go unmet, which involves, crucially,
the recognition that the primary caregiver is a separate person.
And while the infant, in non-pathological cases, feels that it
may continue to depend upon the primary caregiver for
nourishment and security, there is nevertheless a growing
sense that the world itself does not depend on its desire. Thus
external reality is first identified as that which refuses to
satisfy desire: that is, reality, as reality, is primarily identified
as painful, as an insult and injury to that infantile sense of
omnipotence, of permeating oneness with, and magical control
over, the world. And so by the same token the self, in its
original, originating sense, is elementally identified by the
emptying of desire, by desire divested of its object. That is,
the sense of self is primarily identified by, indeed primarily
appears as, the emptiness and independence of desire itself,
torn from the world with which it once communed. The
process of individuation, then, the emergence of a sense of an
independently existing self inhabiting an independently
existing world, is intrinsically traumatic (Trilling, 2000).
This starkly drawn sketch seeks to make clear the
disillusionment inherent in the psychoanalytic picture of
development. Yet part of Winnicott’s project is to highlight
the positive and adaptive aspects of coping during
development, and emphasize the possibility of investment in
the world in the face of its emotional divestment (Storr, 1989).
Again, although the infant, if well cared for, feels secure in the
environment provided by the primary caregiver (what
Winnicott calls the holding environment), the move from the
illusion of magical omnipotence to a sense of helpless
dependence nevertheless represents a fundamental (and of
course necessary) break, and the infant finds itself in a bare
objective world that no longer answers to its wishes (indeed
objectivity here is understood precisely as the refusal of
wishful thinking). But the infant also begins to become aware
of its ability to move its own body, and comes to see that,
while the outer world itself may not directly obey its
commands, its body, however haltingly, does, and may be
used to move towards and to handle objects out in the world.
This marks the beginning of a sense of manipulation, and
hence of objects being manipulable. Another means of acting
on this emerging object-directed attitude is through the
gestural and vocal expression of needs and desires to
physically competent grownups, marking the start of
communication and the gradual process of making intelligible
to others one’s wants and needs, in the ongoing negotiation of
desire and expectation that constitutes socialization. Thus the
infant discovers, along with its own developing manipulability
and physical coordination, that other people may be addressed
to help to attain its objects and goals. This mixture or package
of interpersonal interaction and the exertion of control over
objects may be viewed as the move from a strictly dyadic and
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dependent relationship between infant and caregiver towards
triadic interactions involving infant, caregiver and the
environment.
The question arises, however, of whether the infant would
even be drawn towards the world, rather than withdrawn from
it, given the very existence of external objective reality as
painful, its identification as that which repudiates desire. It is
here that the concept of transitional objects plays its central
facilitating role. At this point it is worth noting that Winnicott
developed his ideas through attentive observation of infants
and children. And, for all of the aforementioned theoretical
speculation, the phenomena of transitional objects themselves
are quite open and available to everyday view, as the soft doll
or toy that the child cannot do without, or the blanket or piece
of fabric, and so on. Yet the theory helps explain the
phenomenon, illuminating its importance in terms of the deep
need it serves the child.
The child’s thoroughgoing
attachment to the transitional object is partly accounted for by
its status as a substitute for the caregiver (in the original
formulation, a substitute for the mother, more specifically the
mother’s breast), as a symbol of the safety of that primary
relation. But the object is termed transitional for a reason, and
not only serves as a reminder of a previous state but plays a
transitive role as well, namely to foster an affective
directedness towards the world and its objects. For in order
for the infant to feel moved towards the world, the world must
be in some sense inviting, responsive to engagement. Hence,
in the wake of the traumatic fissure between self and world,
the child imbues objects with affect and feeling, in order to
both cope with the trauma of disillusionment and dependency
and to form attachments with the outside world. Winnicott
takes care to emphasize the not-me status of the transitional
object for the infant: the object itself is understood as real, as
not under the fantasy of omnipotent control, yet it nevertheless
retains an element of fantasy, as a token or memento of that
once magical control. So perhaps the child can feel that at
least a small part of the world of objects is still under the spell
of its fantastical control. Indeed, laying claim to the
transitional object is a manifestation of the child’s growing
capacity for physical manipulation and control, an expression
of its ability to subject objects to its desires. The transitional
object, after all, is a possession, something over which the
child exerts exclusive rights. At the beginning of the
appearance of transitional phenomena, a single possession
tends to serve as the transitional object. However, Winnicott
speaks of transitional phenomena eventually spreading out
“over the whole cultural field,” informing an intermediate
realm between “inner psychic reality and the external world”
(91). Transitional phenomena, then, come to form a space
where desire and emotion are not repudiated but interfused
into the activities themselves. This is a space of imaginative
engagement and play, in which a child becomes absorbed in
fantasy, where toys and objects are magically infused, where
adults engage in art and ritual, and where culture in general
allows us to make a home for ourselves in the world. In this
intermediate area of creative fantasy, nevertheless subject to
reality-testing, the world of objects may still be imbued with
emotion, responsive to, and invested with, meaning and value.
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TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS AND JOINT ATTENTION
These dynamics may be viewed as affective aspects of
what is conceptualized in cognitive terms as joint attention,
with the development of dyadic and triadic interactions
comprised of parallel streams of emotion and cognition, affect
and attention. As described in the cognitive literature, strictly
dyadic relations describe mental interaction and exchange
between two people, the sharing of attention from one self or
mind to another, whereas triadic relations entail the
introduction of a third entity, whether an object or another
person, into the interaction. Again, dyadic relations tend to
characterize early infant attachment with the primary
caregiver, while triadic relations indicate the capacity to
conceive of a world of independently existing persons and
objects. The capacity for joint attention, in which attention
concerning a third object or person is reciprocally shared
between two people, is central to triadic interactions
(Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). This triangulation between
people and objects in the world is crucial to a sense of a shared
interpersonal world, which in turn is central to the notion of an
independently existing objective world (Davidson, 2001). The
concept of transitional objects brings to the fore the affective
aspects of these interactions, providing insight into the needs
and motives driving their development. For instance, in order
for the world of objects to hold an infant’s attention, it must
also hold the infant’s affection. And these common objects
are introduced to the infant under the eye of the caregiver,
with the other person serving as gateway and guide to the
objective world. Thus the interpersonal is required to relate to
the world, to inhabit it, learn about it, and engage with it
(Tomasello et al, 2005). To a certain extent the relation
between joint attention and affect has been recognized: indeed
infant smiling is used to gauge attention (Stahl & Striano,
2005); however, the theoretical relationship, we argue, may be
elaborated by the notion of transitional objects.
There is the question, though, of the temporal relation of
transitional objects to joint attention. On the one hand, the
criterion of physical manipulability obviously places the
emergence of transitional objects per se, in the sense of a
single object consistently handled and carried by the child,
later than joint attention. For transitional objects in their fuller
manifestations are part and parcel with the ability to physically
interact with objects, to exert a certain degree of control over
them. However Winnicott states: “I suggest that the pattern of
transitional phenomena begins to show at about 4-6-8-12
months. Purposely I leave room for wide variations.” (91)
Winnicott includes as early instances of transitional
phenomena an infant’s handling and mouthing of immediately
proximate objects (e.g., the corner of its blanket), and so as
nascent indications of directedness towards objects and others.
This timeline matches recent infant studies of joint attention
and object-directedness, in which sensitivity to triadic
interactions has been detected as early as 3 months (Striano &
Stahl, 2005). Thus the broader category of transitional
phenomena, as delineated by Winnicott, appears to be roughly
coextensive with the phenomena of triadic interactions as
experimentally ascertained so far.
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AUTISM, TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS, AND SOCIAL
ROBOTICS
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is marked by deficits in
both dyadic and, especially, triadic interactions, capacities at
the core of social interaction (Baron-Cohen 1997, Charman
2003). Again, approaching these social developmental deficits
via transitional objects may illuminate the emotional and
affective aspects of autistic interaction with others and with
the world. The preponderance of tantrums and repetitive
behaviors, for instance, indicates the intensities and deep
frustrations of many autistic children, and any insight into
potential coping and soothing interventions may help with the
difficult transition into social life. Indeed Temple Grandin’s
“squeeze machine” (Sacks, 1995) is a famous case of selfadministered therapy that might be interpretable along the
lines of Winnicott’s notion of the holding environment.
Furthermore, it appears an open question as to whether people
with autism suffer from a deficit in social responsiveness, and
hence are more comfortable interacting with comparatively
predictable physical objects and systems, or whether they
suffer from an excess of social responsiveness, to the point
where they are overwhelmed by other people and hence find
refuge in the world of objects. While both may lead to similar
behavioral profiles, the difference may make a difference for
therapeutic theory and intervention. For instance, dysfunction
in social filtering has been hypothesized in autism (e.g.,
Kozima et al, 2009), resulting in difficulty in selectively
filtering meaningful social information. This sense of finding
the social world painful and bewildering in its complexity
might be addressable in terms of transitional objects, with
transitional objects functioning as possible buffers or
mediators between the physical and social worlds.
Robots may be seen as such intermediate entities, and
indeed social robots have been used in autism research and
therapy to facilitate social interactions in children with autism,
with the Aurora Project (Robins et al, 2004) and Keepon
(Kozima et al, 2009) as representative examples. Keepon, a
robot designed for “facilitating the exchange of attention and
emotion with people” (Kozima et al. 2009), has been shown to
successfully act as an interpersonal “pivot”, an anchor for
shared attention and interpersonal interaction between autistic
children and caregivers. In therapeutic play sessions, dyadic
and triadic interactions emerged between some of the autistic
children, Keepon and the therapist or caregiver. The simple
toy-like features and minimal embodied movements of
Keepon evoke and express the basic mental capacities of
attention and emotion. In other words, it can demonstrate both
external directedness toward objects in the environment
(attention) and internal evaluative responses to those objects
(emotion). These basic functions, of appearing to attend to
objects and to process them emotionally, coordinate to
simulate and facilitate dyadic and triadic interactions, enabling
the robot to serve as a focal point for autistic children in the
emergence of joint attention. Again, difficulty with basic
dyadic interactions, and the seeming impossibility of triadic
relations, predominantly characterize the social cognitive
deficits of autism. However, Kozima and his colleagues
keenly observe that Keepon's promotion of mutual
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interpersonal interaction between autistic children and
caregivers indicates the presence of intact motivation on the
part of autistic children to share and express their emotions
and intentions.
Further explanations of the effects of these roboticallyfacilitated therapeutic situations center on the conception of
social robots as intermediaries between the human world and
the object world, between the social intentional world and the
physical world of objects. On the one hand, the therapeutic
benefits of social robotics may be explained in terms of the
robots functioning as simpler and more predictable social
entities, and hence as a less complex and unpredictable entry
into social relations. This explanation fits with the conception
of autism as involving an essential social cognitive deficiency
or lack. However, if the social difficulties of autism have to
do rather with an excess of social responsiveness, of being
overwhelmed by complex social stimuli, then the benefits of
social robotics become more a matter of emotional
management, of containment of and coping with these
overwhelming social responses, in which case the robot’s
status as a transitional object becomes more prominent. It
might be said, somewhat simplistically, that the former
explanation has a more cognitive inflection, while the latter is
endowed with a more emotional dimension. But of course
“cognition” and “emotion” intimately and inextricably
interact, with cognitive simplicity and emotional security
ultimately going hand in hand. Indeed the reduction of
cognitive complexity may be seen as intrinsic to transitional
objects generally, as central to their ability to foster a sense of
manageability and control (Wastell, 1999). Thus the fact that
these social robots simplify and distill certain salient social
cues serves to ameliorate and facilitate the cognitive and
affective aspects of social interactions.
The animate nature of robots also resonates with the
concept of transitional objects. Again the growing child at
once recognizes the object as not-me, as a part of the outside
world, and yet imbues it with fantasy, treating it as a facet of
inner psychic life. This intermediacy accounts for the child’s
deep affective attachment to the transitional object, for it
allows room for one’s inner life out in the outer world; it is the
animate made animate by the imagination.
As such,
transitional phenomena may be seen as the entry into
symbolism and metaphor, into the ability to recognize some
particular thing (object, image, utterance, etc…) both as itself
and as directed towards something else. To treat something in
terms of something else, to move beyond concrete literality
into analogy and metaphor, is a capacity that people with
autism often appear to lack, and indeed an incapacity for
spontaneous pretend play, for play overlaid by pretense and
fantasy, is one of the early indicators of autism (Charman et al,
1997). What accounts for this difficulty with multiplicity of
representation, and with otherness more generally, is beyond
our scope here; however, the ability of robots to enable more
dynamic interactions with autistic children may be seen in
terms of the literalization of the normally symbolic function of
transitional objects. That is, social robots, as animated objects
responsive to children’s interaction, as objects come alive as it
were, may be viewed as the magical made manifest, as the
actualization of the fantastical character of transitional objects.
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While typically developing children can imaginatively
animate inanimate objects for transitional purposes, autistic
children may require this normally imaginative and symbolic
animacy to be actualized in some way. And perhaps the
animacy and interactivity of social robots awakens and
enables the transitional impulse, offering autistic children a
way into the intersubjective object world by suggesting the
possibility that that world is indeed responsive to their needs
and fantasies, that the outer world does yield a place for their
inner lives, thus allowing space for the expression of their
internal states. For again one of the key claims of Kozima et
al is that the motivation to express mental states remains intact
in autism: the problem resides in enabling the means of
expression. Transitional objects serve precisely this purpose,
as a primary bridge between the inner and outer worlds of
developing children, and conceiving social robots as
transitional objects for autistic children, as objects literally
made animate and “brought to life”, may help account for their
facilitative power, and further experimental and theoretical
work on the affective aspects of joint attention and triadic
interactions.
TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS IN ORGANIZATIONAL
SETTINGS
Wastell (1999) represents a rare study applying the notion
of transitional objects to organizations. Wastell diagnoses
repeated information systems failure in terms of social
defenses that inhibit and paralyze learning and engagement.
As a remedy, he advocates conceiving the development of
information systems in terms of a transitional space,
consisting of a supportive psychological environment
providing opportunities for creative engagement and play. In
cases, for instance, where different departments within an
organization are caught in intractable conflict, Wastell
describes the use of models and simulations as transitional
objects of sorts, relieving risk and anxiety and fostering a
sense of safety by simplifying aspects of the development
process. Furthermore modeling may serve as a means of
facilitating joint attention, offering a common object and goal
in the form of a transformable object. And while models and
simulations are more explicitly goal-oriented than traditional
transitional objects, they are nonetheless transitional in the
sense of supplying malleable and manipulable objects in the
course of development.
Indeed the increasing use of
simulations in medical training, where emergency scenarios
involving mannequins are invested with a sense of urgency
and reality (Gordon et al, 2001), speaks perhaps to their
transitional status, both in the conferral of lifelikeness upon
the mannequins and as an early transitional stage in medical
education.
Robotic transitional objects, we speculatively suggest,
may also play a role in organizational settings, in that the
robot may serve, if not quite as a full-fledged transitional
object per se, then as a common object of attention, an
attentional anchor as it were, around which a group of people
may organize and cohere. Such a group may also be viewed
as a kind of developing or emerging entity, in which case the
development role of transitional objects comes to the fore. For
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instance, human-robot teams may be understood as
(macro)cognitive systems onto themselves, and hence as
developing entities in need of facilitation and transition. In
these situations, an interactive robot might serve as jointattentional pivot that keeps the team members focused on the
same goals, especially if the robot itself is a primary vehicle
for achieving those goals.
CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
We thus propose that the concept of transitional objects
illuminates the affective aspects of the development of dyadic
and triadic interactions. We plan future research relating
transitional objects to notions of primary and secondary
intersubjectivity, which describe the development of our
embodied interactions with others within shared pragmatic
contexts and situations (Trevarthen 1979, Gallagher & Hutto
2008). Additionally the concept may be applied to the
emerging use of social robots in autism research and therapy,
with the robots themselves functioning potentially as
transitional objects in the facilitation of joint attention and
triadic interactions. Furthermore social robotics generally
may be informed by theories that emphasize the affective and
interactive qualities of objects; indeed, this proposal may be
seen as among those advocating for the inherently emotional
and affective aspects of social robotic design and humanrobotic interaction (Breazeal 2003, Picard et al 2004). Again,
it is precisely because autism provides a window into certain
social deficiencies that it is a catalyst for exploration of the
role of robotics in human interaction. And while we make no
causal claims connecting transitional objects, or the failure
thereof, to the etiology of autism, the concept may
nevertheless provide insight into aspects of its manifestation
and treatment. Indeed, insofar as human development
demonstrates the sensitivity to initial conditions that
characterizes complex systems, cautious attention to early
pivotal interactions may well prove revealing.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Composition of this paper was partially supported by the
Army Research Laboratory and was accomplished under
Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-10-2-0016. The
views and conclusions contained in this document are those of
the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the
official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army
Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government or the University
of Central Florida. The U.S. Government is authorized to
reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes
notwithstanding any copyright notation herein.
REFERENCES
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of
mind. MIT Press.
Bigelow, A. E., MacLean, K. and Proctor, J. (2004). The role of joint attention
in the development of infants’ play with objects. Developmental Science,
7, 518–526.
Breazeal, C. (2003). Emotion and sociable humanoid robots. International
Journal of Human Computer Studies, 59, 119–155.

1490

Charman, T. (2003). Why is joint attention a pivotal skill in autism?
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 358, 315-324.
Charman, T., Swettenham, J., Baron-Cohen, S. Cox, A., Baird, G., & Drew,
A. (1997). Infants with autism: An investigation of empathy, pretend
play, joint attention, and imitation. Developmental Psychology, 5(33),
781-789.
Davidson, D. (2001). Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Frankland, A. (2010). The Little Psychotherapy Book: Object Relations in
Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. & Hutto, D. (2008). Understanding others through primary
interaction and narrative practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha, & E.
Itkonen (Eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Gordon, J.A., Wilkerson, W.M., Shaffer, D.W., & Armstrong, E.G. (2001).
“Practicing” medicine without risk: students’ and educators’ responses
to high-fidelity patient simulation. Academic Medicine, 76(5): 469-472.
Kozima, H., (2002). Infanoid: a babybot that explores the social environment.
In K. Dautenhahn et al. (Eds), Socially Intelligent Agents: Creating
Relationships with computers and robots (65-81). Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic.
Kozima, H., Michalowski, M.P., & Nakagawa, C. (2009). Keepon: A Playful
Robot for Research, Therapy, and Entertainment. International Journal
of Social Robotics, 1, 3-18.
Mone,
G.
(2010).
The
new
face
of
autism
therapy.
http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-05/humanoid-robots-arenew-therapists
Picard, R.W., Bender, W., Blumberg, B., Breazeal, C., Cavallo, D., Machover,
T., Papert, S., Resnick, M., Roy, D., Y Strohecker, C. (2004). Affective
learning—A manifesto. BT Technology Journal. 4(22), 1-17.
Robins, B., Dickerson, P., Stribling, P., & Dautenhahn, K. (2004). Robotmediated joint attention in children with autism: A case study in robothuman interaction. Interaction Studies, 5(2), 161-198.
Rochat, P. (in press). Possession and morality in early development. New
Directions in Child and Adolescent Development.
Rycroft, C. (1995). A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, Second Edition.
London: Puffin.
Sacks, O. (1995). An anthropologist on Mars: Seven paradoxical tales. New
York: Knopf.
Stahl, D. & Striano, T. (2005). Joint attention in the first year: The
coordination of gaze and affect between 7 and 10 months of age. In
Berthouze, L., Kaplan, F., Kozima, H., Yano, H., Konczak, J., Metta, G.,
Nadel, J., Sandini, G., Stojanov, G. and Balkenius, C. (Eds.)
Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Epigenetic
Robotics: Modeling Cognitive Development in Robotic Systems. Lund
University Cognitive Studies. 123.
Storr, A. (1989). Freud. Oxford University Press.
Striano, T., & Stahl, D. (2005). Sensitivity to triadic attention in early
infancy. Developmental Science. 4(8), 333-343.
Striano, T., Stahl, D., Cleveland, A., & Hoehl, S. (2006). Sensitivity to
triadic attention between 6 weeks and 3 months of age. Infant Behavior
and Development, 529-534.
Subbotsky, E. V. (1994). Early rationality and magical thinking in
preschoolers: Space and time. British Journal of Developmental
Psychology, 12, 97-108.
Tomasello, M., Farrar, M.J. (1986). Joint Attention and Early Language.
Child Development, 57, 1454-1463.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005).
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675 - 691.
Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: a
description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before
Speech. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Trilling, L. (2000). The moral obligation to be intelligent: Selected essays.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Wastell, D.G. (1999). Learning dysfunctions in information systems
development: Overcoming the social defense with transitional objects.
MIS Quarterly, 23(4), 581-600.
Winnicott, D.W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena: A
study of the first not-me possession. The International Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 34, 89-97.

Downloaded from pro.sagepub.com at University of Wollongong on April 8, 2014

